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GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY:
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION OF
WOMEN FROM COMBAT
INTRODUCTION
Although gender-based discrimination has existed in one form
or another for thousands of years,' it has only recently come within
the realm of judicial scrutiny in the United States.2 Federal statutes
t The writer does not intend to comment upon the legality of the draft
or war in general. This Note assumes for the sake of argument that it is necessary
at times for the United States to involve itself and its citizens in a war.
1. The Bible provides many examples of differing treatment for men and
women. For instance, the Israelites were forbidden to covet any of their neighbor's
possessions. This included the neighbor's house, servants, animals, and wife. Women
were considered chattel. See, Exodus 20:17 (King JamesX"Thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor
his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's.") See
also Numbers 5:12-31 (King James) (part of the law describing the differing treatment
for men and women committing adultery).2. This Note addresses those instances where gender-based discrimination
has been challenged on the grounds of equal protection as embodied in the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. That amendment reads in pertinent part: "No state
shall . . . deny any person . . . the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, S 1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment precludes "irra-
tional discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a
law." Goesaert v. Clearly, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). It does not allow states to legislate
different treatment for individuals on the bases of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of the statute. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Accord, Barbier v. Con-
nolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
The Supreme Court first considered an equal protection challenge to a gender-
based classification in 1948. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan statute
which forbade any female to be licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or
daughter of the male owner upheld). It was as recently as 1971 that the first statutory
gender-based classification was struck down as discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), a provision of the Idaho probate
code was challenged on equal protection grounds. The provision designated the per-
sons entitled to administer an estate of an individual who died intestate. Fathers and
mothers were members of the same entitlement class. When members of the same
class claimed the right to administer the estate, the provision required a mandatory
preference to males over females. The state's objective behind the classification was
the reduction of the workload on probate courts by the elimination of one class of
individuals claiming entitlement. The Supreme Court recognized that the objective
was not without some legitimacy. However, the objective was not advanced by the
classification in a manner consistent with the command of the equal protection clause,
and therefore the statute was declared unconstitutional.
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that classify on the basis of gender,3 including those governing military
practices and policies,' have been subject to equal protection challenges.'
Significantly, many of the Court's decisions upholding some form of
gender-based discrimination in the context of the military,' did so by
relying on statutes that prohibit the assignment of women to any com-
bat and combat-related positions.7 The Supreme Court, however, has
never considered a direct challenge to the constitutionality of those
statutes. The Court has set a dangerous precedent by relying on statutes
3. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (provision of Social Secur-
ity Act allowing women a more profitable formula by which to calculate old-age retire-
ment benefits than the formula applicable to men upheld); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (provision of Social Security Act requiring widowers to prove financial
dependence on wife before receiving survivors' benefits, while not requiring similar
proof of widows held invalid); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (provision
of Social Security Act granting survivors' benefits to wife and minor children of deceased
husband and father, but only to minor children of deceased mother held invalid).
4. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (federal statute requiring
the registration of males only for possible compulsory military service upheld because
of combat restrictions on women); Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) (Massachusetts' veteran preference statute granting absolute lifetime
preference to veterans for civil service positions upheld); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975) (federal statutes allowing female naval officers a longer period of time
to attain promotion before mandatory discharge than male naval officers upheld because
combat restrictions on women did not grant them the same opportunities for promo-
tion); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (federal statutes requiring female
Air Force officer to prove her spouse's actual financial dependence before obtaining
increased benefits, while statutes did not require male Air Force officers to prove
actual financial dependence for the spouses held invalid); Campbell v. Beaughler, 519
F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975) (Marine Corps regulation requiring male reservists to refrain
from wearing short hair wigs in combat, but not female reservists, upheld); Owens
v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978) (federal statute prohibiting the assignment
of female personnel on Navy vessels other than hospital ships and transports held
invalid); United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d
673 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976) (federal statutes providing for
registration, induction, and training of male citizens only, upheld).
5. Federal statutes alleged to be violative of equal protection rights are
challenged on the basis of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. That amendment
reads in pertinent part that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[WIhile the Fifth Amendment
contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is so 'unjustifiable
as to be violative of due process.' " Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
6. See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
7. Women are statutorily restricted from combat participation in the Air
Force and Navy. "Female members of the Air Force . . .may not be assigned to
duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." 10 U.S.C. S 8549 (1959). "[Wlomen may
not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions
10 U.S.C. § 6015 (Supp. 1981). The Marine Corps and the Army prohibit the assign-
ment of women to combat by policy. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 76.
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employing blanket gender-based classifications to justify additional
statutory gender-based classifications Basing the constitutionality of
one statutory classification on a similar classification whose constitu-
tional soundness has never been considered is questionable at best.
This note considers the constitutionality of Sections 8549 and 6015
under Title 10, which prohibit the assignment of women to combat
positions. An analysis of the constitutionality of those statutes must
begin with a determination of the appropriate standard of review to
be applied in cases alleging gender discrimination. There is "an uneven
and somewhat unsteady trend in the development of a single body
of principles to apply in cases raising claims of sex discrimination."9
Nonetheless, a single standard of review seems to have emerged,"0
and the constitutionality of Sections 8549 and 6015 will be considered
in light of that standard. The currently accepted standard requires
the Court to examine challenged statutes to determine if the gender-
based classification bears a substantial relationship to important govern-
mental objectives.' The degree to which military necessity and the
protection of women, the asserted governmental objectives underlying
Sections 8549 and 6015, actually comport with reality is analyzed in
the remainder of the note. The ultimate issue is divided into two parts.
The first is whether the objectives of military necessity and the protec-
tion of women are important governmental objectives. If this question
8. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511-12 n.1 (1975) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting), Justice Brennan also stated his uneasiness with the Court's legal reasoning:
Indeed, I find quite troublesome the notion that a gender-based difference
in treatment can be justifed by another, broader, gender-based difference
in treatment imposed directly and currently by the Navy itself. While
it is true that the restrictions upon women officers' opportunities for pro-
fessional service are not here directly under attack, they are obviously
implicated on the Court's chosen ground for decision, and the Court ought
at least to consider whether they may be valid before sustaining a provi-
sion it conceives to be based upon them.
[Emphasis in original].
9. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 303 (D.D.C. 1978). In Owens, female
naval personnel instituted an action challenging the gender-based classification pro-
hibiting the assignment of women to any navy vessel other than hospital ships and
transports. The district court reviewed the statute to determine if the gender-based
classification substantially furthered the goal of maintaining an efficient, prepared,
and well-disciplined navy. The court concluded that the gender-based classification did
not substantially further that goal, and held the statute violative of fourteenth amend-
ment rights.
10. The standard was announced by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
11. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This standard has come to be viewed
as the middle-tier standard. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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is answered in the affirmative, the second question is whether the
important governmental objective is substantially furthered by the
general prohibition against women in combat in a manner consistent
with the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Because the statutes
that prohibit the assignment of women to combat do not satisfy the
requirements imposed by the standard of review, the statutes would
not be able to withstand an equal protection challenge. This note then
suggests some possible solutions to the legitimate problems associated
with an immediate assignment of women to previously all-male combat
units, resulting in sexually integrated combat units.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW IN GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION CASES
Traditionally, the Supreme Court examines equal protection claims
by applying the "rational basis" test"2 to the challenged classification.
If a "suspect classification"'3 or a fundamental right 4 is involved, the
Court reviews the classification with "strict judicial scrutiny."" Strict
judicial scrutiny requires the Court to examine the classification in
light of the compelling interest doctrine." Classifications subject to
strict judicial scrutiny can be sustained only if the compelling govern-
mental interests cannot be achieved without the use of the challenged
classification. 7
While gender-based classifications challenged on equal protection
grounds presently are not subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, gender
is analogous to recognized suspect classifications, and therefore entitled
to strict judicial scrutiny. Classifications based on race, national origin,
and alienage are suspect classifications." Historically, individuals
12. The rational basis test is best stated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961). The Court stated that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 426. See also,
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
13. Classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin are inherently
suspect. See, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). See also infra notes
18-29 and accompanying text, describing the characteristics of suspect classes.
14. Fundamental rights recognized by the Court include the right to vote,
the right to engage in interstate travel, the right to have children, and the right to
political association. See generally, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660-62 (1969).
15. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
16. The compelling interest doctrine states that classifications involving a
suspect class or a fundamental right must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest to withstand a constitutional challenge. Id. at 627.
17. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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classified according to those criteria have been targets of discrimination. 9
Similarly, the United States has a long and unfortunate history of
gender discrimination," using gender as a touchstone for pervasive
but often subtle discrimination." Furthermore, gender, like the recognized
suspect classifications, is an immutable characteristic acquired by an
accident of birth' and often bears no relationship to the individual's
ability to do a particular job or task. 3 In addition, suspect classes
are usually discrete and insular minorities.24 Women are not a numerical
minority; still, they are inadequately represented in many of the decision-
making forums in this nation.25 Women "still suffer from the selective
sympathy and indifference of predominantly male lawmakers,"26 who
have rarely felt the effects of gender classifications. 7 The results of
such classifications are to relegate an entire group of human beings
to an inferior legal status," as well as branding them with the stigma
of second-class citizenship.' Because of the similarities between gender
and suspect classifications, gender should be recognized by the Supreme
Court as a suspect classification and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
Despite these similarties, the Court has declined to recognize
gender classifications as suspect. At least three members of the Court 0
19. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
20. Id. at 684.
21. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
22. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 686; Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
357 (1974).
23. See supra note 22.
24. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938).
25. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17. Justice Brennan noted that
women are "vastly underrepresented in this Nation's decisionmaking councils." Some
of the statistics the justice cited are no longer accurate, the most notable change be-
ing the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to the United States Supreme
Court. However, the basic premise supported by the facts is still correct, that women
are underrepresented throughout all levels of the State and Federal governments.
26. Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199,
212 (1979).
27. Id.
28. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 686. See also, Brown, Emerson, Falk
& Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871, 872 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Emerson]. Cf.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
29. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 979.
30. In Frontiero, Justice Powell authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Powell noted that the adoption of the
Equal Rights Amendment would resolve the question of the appropriate standard of
review in gender discrimination cases. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell,
J., concurring). Furthermore, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
1983]
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cited the possible ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment" as
requiring the Court to adopt an attitude of restraint so as not to assume
a decisional responsibility more properly left in the hands of the people.2
A premature decision making gender a suspect classification would
impair confidence in the restraint of the Court,33 and would not reflect
the Court's respect for the prescribed legislative processes. 4 Such a
justification for judicial restraint was certainly meritorious in 1973."5
However, nonratification of the Equal Rights Amendment has seriously
undercut that argument.3"
Nonratification of the Equal Rights Amendment should not cripple
the cause of sexual equality. Even Justice Powell acknowledged that
"[tihere are times when [the] Court, under our system, cannot avoid
a constitutional decision on issues which normally should be resolved
by the elected representatives of the people."37 Both proponents and
opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment agree that there already
exists a constitutional basis in both the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment addressing gender-based discrimination. 8 The perceived problem
is the Court's lack of active application of equal protection principles
dissenting), Chief Justice Burger noted the lack of a constitutional basis disfavoring
gender-based classifications, therefore refusing to subject gender-based classifications
to a higher standard of review than that required in the rational basis test.
31. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The proposed amendment reads
in pertinent part: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
32. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Equal Rights Amendment had just been submitted to the states for
ratification in 1972.
36. The deadline for the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment was June
30, 1982. Thirty-five states ratified the amendment, falling three short of the necessary
thirty-eight. See, Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV.
199, 205 n.36 (1979). The question of the correct standard of review would have been
resolved with the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. See generally, Brown,
Emerson, supra note 28. Accord, Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military,
82 YALE L.J. 1533, 1534 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ERA and the Military]. If the Equal
Rights Amendment had been ratified, sex would no longer have been a justifiable
legal basis for differentiation. In addition, the normal presumption of validity would
have been reversed, placing a heavy burden on the government to justify the dif-
ferent treatment. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 880, 889. This interpretation of
the Equal Rights Amendment constitutes the primary legislative history of the amend-
ment and has been endorsed by the two principle proponents of the amendment, Con-
gresswoman Martha Griffiths and Senator Birch Bayh. ERA and the Military at 1536.
37. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. 116 CONG. REC. H35, 448 (daily. ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (remarks of Con-
gresswoman Griffiths).
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to strike down statutory gender-based classifications. 9 Admittedly, con-
gressional debates concerning the Equal Rights Amendment took place
prior to many of the Supreme Court's decisions that struck down gender-
based classifications. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has
since applied the fourteenth and fifth amendments to strike down many
statutes employing gender-based classifications only strengthens the
argument that the fourteenth and fifth amendments can provide the
constitutional support for making gender a suspect classification. Thus,
the Court's recognition of gender as a suspect classification is not con-
tingent upon ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Although the Court has a constitutional basis for subjecting gender-
based classifications to strict judicial scrutiny, it has not done so.4'
Neither does it apply the rational basis test. The Court's deliberations
in cases alleging gender discrimination have been characterized by
sharp disagreement among members of the Court over the proper
standard and analysis in such cases. 2 A seeming accommodation was
39. Id. See also, 117 CONG. REC. H35, 801 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks
of Congressman Danielson).
40. The ideals and goals underlying the Equal Rights Amendment are neither
new nor unique. The Equal Rights Amendment only states explicitly what this nation
has proclaimed to be its very foundation. The writers of the Declaration of Independence
declared: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The Declaration of Independence
(U.S. 1776). If this statement is accepted as an integral part of the organic laws of
the United States and therefore the truth that all persons are created equal is self-
evident, then ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is not necessary before the
Court recognizes gender as a suspect classification.
Sexual equality before the law is part of a claim by women for the elimination
of rigid sex role determinism. Sexual equality demands "the recognition of individual
potential, the development of new sets of relationships between individuals and groups,
and the establishment of institutions which will promote the values and respect the
sensibilities of all persons." Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 885. Furthermore, a
Judiciary Committee's Report to the United States Senate stated:
The ERA embodies a moral value judgment that a legal right or obliga-
tion should not depend on sex but on other factors . . . the judgment
is rooted in the basic concern of society with the individual, and with
the right of each individual to develop his [her] own potentiality . . . the
legal principle underlying the ERA is that the law must deal with individual
attributes.
Krauskopf, The Equal Rights Amendment: Its Political and Practical Context, 50 CAL.
ST. B. J. 78, 79 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Krauskopf].
41. A plurality of the Court did recognize gender as a suspect classification
in Frontiero. Constituting the plurality were Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and
Marshall.
42. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. at 303; Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981); Note, Broadening Access to the Courts and
Clarifying Judicial Standards: Sex Discrimination Cases in the 1978-1979 Supreme Court
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reached in Craig v. Boren.43 This accommodation is commonly referred
to as the "middle-tier""' standard. The middle-tier standard requires
that gender-based classifications "serve important governmental
objectives." 5
The middle-tier standard of review requires the Court to deter-
mine whether the legislative assumptions underlying the gender-based
classification are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be supportive
of the asserted justifications for the use of the gender-based
classification." Stated another way, the Court focuses on two lines
of inquiry: first, whether the asserted governmental objective is an
important governmental objective. If the Court determines the objec-
tive is important, the next line of inquiry focuses on whether the gender-
based classification substantially furthers the objective in a manner
consistent with equal protection principles.
Term, 14 RICH. L. REV. 515, 552, 583 (1980); Note, Developing an Equal Protection Stan-
dard For Gender Discrimination Cases-Where's the Rub?, 11 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 293 (1980).
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court stated that the rational basis
test was applicable. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a pluarlity of the
Court stated that sex was a suspect classification, subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), was decided using the rational basis test. The
Court declined to address the question of classification at all in Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7 (1975). The rational basis test was again used in Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975).
43. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
44. Id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell voiced his dissatisfac-
tion with such a characterization, however.
45. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. In Craig, an Oklahoma statutory scheme
which prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21
and to females under the age of 18 was challenged. The state's important governmen-
tal objective was the enhancement of traffic safety. The state contended that statistics
which related traffic violations and accident fatalities to gender and age justified the
gender-based classification and furthered the objective in a manner consistent with
the command of the equal protection clause.
The Court found that the statistical evidence offered by the state did not justify
the use of a gender-based classification. Only .18% of females and 2% of males between
the ages of 18 and 20 were arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
The Court concluded that these statistics did not justify the use of gender as an ac-
curate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving. The Court noted that "prov-
ing broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business and one that
inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Pro-
tection Clause." Id. at 204. Therefore, the Court held that the gender-based differen-
tial, under the middle-tier standard of review, constituted discrimination in violation
of the equal protection clause.
46. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (provision of the Social Security
Act requiring illegitimate children to prove actual financial dependence before receiv-
ing survivors' benefits while not requiring legitimate children to prove actual finan-
cial dependence upheld).
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The question whether a gender-based classification substantially
furthers an important governmental objective is "at best an opaque
one." 7 The Court has made various attempts to explain the criteria
it uses to determine whether a gender-based classification substantially
furthers an important governmental objective. "Substantiality" may
be measured in terms of the degree to which the gender-based classifica-
tion is over- or under-inclusive." Alternately, a gender-based classifica-
tion may be accepted by the Court as substantially furthering the
governmental objective if the state or federal government proves that
the gender-based classification is more effective than a gender-neutral
classification in promoting the asserted interest."9 A statute employing
a gender-based classification will not be accepted by the Court as substan-
tially furthering the objective even if "the generalizations ... reflect[ed]
[by the classification] may be true of the majority of members of the
class .... ."' These guidelines are not distinct approaches for determin-
ing whether a gender-based classification substantially furthers an im-
portant governmental objective. They are more appropriately viewed
as various attempts by the Court to articulate the criteria it uses
to determine whether the challenged classification substantially fur-
thers an important governmental objective.
The Court examines relevant evidence and statistics when it deter-
mines whether the gender-based classification substantially furthers
the important governmental objective.5 1 The party seeking to uphold
the gender-based classification has the burden of proving that the
classification substantially furthers the important governmental
objective.52 It follows that if the party seeking to uphold the gender-
47. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 474 n.10
(1981) (Rehnquist, J.).
48. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. at 305 n.47, citing Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. at 211 n.9. For example, if a gender-based classification presumes all women
possess a certain trait or characteristic when in fact not all women do possess that
trait or characteristic, the classification is over-inclusive; it includes some women who
should not be included. A gender-based classification that presumes no men possess
a particular trait when in fact some men do possess that characteristic is under-inclusive.
49. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. at 496 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
50. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Steward, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart further states that a gender-based classification need not ring false
to work a discrimination that in the individual case might be invidious. Id. A precise
definition of invidious discrimination has never been articulated by the Court.
51. See, e.g., the Court's analysis of the data in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at
200-03, and Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. at 464 & nn.3-6.
52. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. at 489 n.2, 496
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 88 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
19831
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based classification comes forward with little or no evidence to support
the classification, that party fails to prove the gender-based classifica-
tion substantially furthers the objective,53 and therefore the classifica-
tion will not be upheld.
The middle-tier standard of review enunciated in Craig v. Boren,54
is the presently accepted standard in gender-based discrimination cases.55
The standard is a compromise between the rational basis test and
the compelling interest test. Because it is the standard now used by
the Court, and despite the need for the Court to move beyond this
compromise, Sections 8549 and 6015, prohibiting the assignment of
women to combat and combat-related positions will be analyzed under
the middle-tier standard of review.
II. STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF WOMEN IN COMBAT
Currently, the defense of this nation is the responsibility of men.
The exclusion of women is justified primarily on two grounds. First,
national security demands that the armed services be efficient and
prepared to defend the nation if necessary. 7 Opponents of women in
combat maintain that women will seriously imperil the national defense
effort. The second justification is that women need protection from
the harsh realities of war." Opponents of women combatants assume
that the "delicate nature" of women, both physically and mentally,
renders women incapable of contributing to the defense of their nation, 9
leaving it to the men to assume the burden of defense.
These two justifications for the exclusion of women from combat
are embodied in the two governmental objectives sought to be furthered
53. Id. See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE S 336, 784 (2d ed. 1972).
54. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
55. See, Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 1977).
56. M. BINKIN & S. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as BINKIN & BACH]. This book is the result of an independent study conducted by
the Brookings Institution. It has been cited by the district court in Owens v. Brown,
455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978), and the United States Supreme Court in Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), and Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979). Accord, ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1533; Brown, Emer-
son, supra note 28 at 967; S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2612, 2647 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 96-826].
57. 117 CONG. REC. H35, 784 (daily ed. Oct 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman
Wiggins); 118 CONG. REC. S9318 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Stennis,
Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services).
58. See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
59. Brown, Emerson, supra, note 28 at 967.
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by the statutory prohibition of women in combat. The first governmen-
tal objective is maintaining national security (hereinafter referred to
as military necessity). Sparing women from the brutality of war is
the second governmental objective. Opponents of women combatants
believe these objectives are substantially furthered by the gender-
based classification utilized in Sections 8549 and 6015.
The remainder of this note analyzes the asserted objectives and
the evidence tendered in support of them. The analysis is divided into
two lines of inquiry.6 0 The first is whether the two asserted governmen-
tal objectives are important governmental objectives. If this question
is answered in the affirmative, the second line of inquiry focuses on
whether the objective is substantially furthered by the gender-based
classification in a manner consistent with the demands of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.
A. Military Necessity
That the maintenance of our national security is in fact an impor-
tant governmental objective seems too self-evident to merit in-depth
discussion. It is Congress' constitutional responsibility to provide for
the defense of the nation by raising and maintaining armies." The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that responsibility,62 and
stated that it is the primary business of armies to fight or be ready
to fight should the need arise. Therefore, the governmental objective
of maintaining national security passes the first test of the middle-tier
standard.
The second test of the middle-tier standard focuses on whether
the gender-based classification substantially furthers the important
governmental objective in a manner consistent with the due process
clause. Opponents of women in combat contend that the integration
of women into combat positions will threaten the national security
of the United States. The national security would be threatened for
three reasons. First, women lack the requisite physical strength and
fitness. 4 Second, the integration of women will interfere with group
60. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
61. "The Congress shall have the power to ... raise and support armies ...
to provide and maintain a navy; [and] to make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cls. 12-14.
62. See generally, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); S. REP. No. 96-286, supra note 56 at 156-60.
63. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 501.
64. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 976; Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the
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dynamics, resulting in a decrease in morale and discipline. 5 Third,
the increased costs incurred as a result of the integration will be more
than the armed services can safely absorb." The data and evidence
offered in support of these arguments are analyzed below.
1. Physical Requirements and Capabilities
While the assumption that women are physically unfit for combat
enjoys some support in both the Congress67 and the military
establishment," the validity of this assumption can be challenged on
two grounds. First, the tests administered by the various branches
of the armed services for determining the suitability of an individual
for combat assignment are neither well-defined nor consistently applied. 9
Second, modern warfare relies more on technology than muscle." These
two observations necessitate a re-evaluation of the belief that women
are physically unfit for combat.
In the context of the military, physical fitness includes a combina-
tion of strength, endurance, flexibility, speed, balance, agility, and power. 1
Based on an initial medical examination and a subjective assessment
by a doctor,"2 an individual's combat suitability is determined. The
Draft: A Response to Critics of the Equal Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 199,
202 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hale & Kanowitz]; 126 CONG. REC. S6534 (daily ed. June
10, 1980) (remarks of Senator Javitts); ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1549.
65. ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1551; BINKIN & BACH, supra, note
56 at 89; 126 CONG. REC. S6534 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Senator Javitts);
Brown, Emerson, supra, note 28 at 977.
66. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 56 at 71.
67. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. S6534 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of
Senator Javitts); S. Rep. 96-826, supra, note 56 at 159.
68. Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army, testified in opposition to
the admission of women to the military academies by stating, "The Academy's (West
Point) primary mission of preparing battle leaders for our Nation's military forces
is accomplished through . . . rigorous, unremitting training. Any reduction of this em-
phasis in order to accommodate women would in effect lead to a lowering of stan-
dards for men." BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 49. Former Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown expressed a similar view: "I believe there are sufficient physical dif-
ferences between men and women, on the average, that make it wise, as regulations
provide, that women not be put into combat roles." Id.
69. Id. at 78. See also infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
70. BINKIN & BACH, supra notes 56 at 98. See also infra notes 104-114 and
accompanying text.
71. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 78.
72. Id. The entrance examination consists of seven elements. They are: (1)
clinical examination of the body, (2) laboratory findings, (3) physical measurements
(height, weight, blood pressure, etc.), (4) narrative summary of defects and diagnoses,
(5) subjective determination of military fitness, (6) identification of any disqualifying
defects, and (7) evaluation of the examinee's functional capacity. This final element
is the subjective assessment referred to above.
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doctor's subjective assessment, commonly referred to as the PULHES
profile,"3 serves as an index of the overall capacity of an individual
to perform military duties."
The Army and Air Force correlate PULHES profile serials with
specific specialties and occupations." The Air Force began in 1973 to
establish more specific physical standards for certain specialities and
occupations." However, even these additional standards did not forestall
the misassignment of women."
By contrast, the Navy and the Marine Corps no longer utilize
the PULHES profile with respect to classifications of individuals."8
Furthermore, they have not even established physical standards which
are required for the adequate performance of specific jobs." The discon-
tinued use of the PULHES profile by the Navy and Marine Corps,
without substituting some other appropriate method of measurement,
similarly resulted in women being assigned to jobs for which they
lacked the requisite physical strength.
73. Id. Six factors, representing the major human functions, comprise the
PULHES profile. Those factors are: (1) physical capacity and stamina, (2) upper ex-
tremities, (3) lower extremities, (4) hearing and ear defects, (5) eyes, and (6) psychiatric.
The physician grades each factor on a scale from one to four, with grade 1 being
the highest level of medical fitness.
74. Id. Taking the first factor in the profile, physical capacity and stamina,
an assignment of grade 1 indicates good muscular development of an examinee. The
Army expects the examinee to perform with maximum effort for an indefinite length
of time. Grade 2 is assigned when the examinee has some medical condition or physical
defect which may impose certain job limitations, and is expected to perform with max-
imum effort over long periods of time. An examinee assigned grade 3 has a moderate
defect. The Army expects that individual to perform with maximum effort only for
brief or moderate periods. Grade 4 indicates the examinee is below minimum stan-
dards for enlistment.
75. Id. at 79. The Army requires a perfect profile, "111111," for assignment
into the infantry field.
76. Id. The specialties were classified on the basis of the amount of lifting
the job required. The spectrum ranged from sedentary activity (lifting a maximum
of 10 pounds) to very heavy activity (frequent lifting of a maximum of 50 to 100 pounds).
77. The Air Force reported that 62 of 97 women assigned to aircraft
maintenance were physically unable to perform the work. The duties included chang-
ing aircraft tires and brakes, removing batteries and seats, and breaking torque on
bolts. The Army reported similar problems with five women ammunition storage
"specialists." The women lacked the necessary strength to move the ammunition by
hand. The round weighed about 58 pounds and boxes about 120 pounds. BINKIN &
BACH, supra, note 56 at 80-81.
78. Id. at 79.
79. Id.
80. For instance, the Marine Corps reported in 1976 that women were assigned
to units for training as telephone linespersons. Most of the women assigned were unable
to hoist the necessary equipment, which weighed about 50 pounds. The Navy reported
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These relatively simple standards and imprecise means of measur-
ing physical capability are currently under review by all branches of
the armed services. 1 Some changes have already been instituted.82
The requirements of basic training for men and women have been
revised to apply the same standards to both.83 This revision was in-
stituted because the military assumed that any person meeting minimum
medical standards will be able to acquire the requisite physical fitness
in basic training. 4
Any assessment of the physical capability of women must also
take cognizance of the unique occurrence among women of menstruation
and pregnancy. 5 The physical condition of a pregnant woman gives
that women were assigned to tugboats and other small craft as boatswain's mates. The
supervisors of these craft stated that women were physically incapable of performing
the requisite work. The work included such tasks as lifting and handling sandbags
that weighed 100 pounds, paint cans that weighed from 72-94 pounds, and boat lines
that weighed as much as seven pounds per foot. Id. at 80-81.
81. Id. at 82. Much of the discriminatory treatment in the armed services
had been changed. For instance, many occupational specialties formerly closed to women
have been opend to them. The reason for the change may have been the military's
expectation that the Equal Rights Amendment would be ratified. Krauskopf, supra,
note 40 at 137; BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 14. Why further changes necessary
for justice and fairness must wait until the military feels sufficiently "threatened"
by the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is unclear.
82. See supra note 76, 81.
83. LIFE, Sept. 1981, at 69. The excerpt in LIFE is taken from an unpublished
book by Rogan, Mixed Company: Women in the Modern Army (1981). Compare, ERA
and the Military, supra, note 36 at 1546-47.
84. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 78. Professional women athletes illus-
trate that women, given the opportunity for training and conditioning, can pass the
highest tests of physical fitness. Id. at 83. In fact, women athletes have closed within
10% or less of the best male times in swimming and track. This fact and other ac-
complishments in women's sports, illustrate that women are capable of achieving a
high degree of physical strength and fitness. NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1981, at 75.
85. See generally, Brown, Emerson, supra, note 28 at 929-32, 974-76. Compulsory
maternity leave regulations, both in the private sector and the military are discussed
in the context of the Equal Rights Amendment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on account of sex. This absolute prohibi-
tion is qualified. Title VII provisions do not apply in instances where sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the performance of the
specific job. The authors analogize the BFOQ to differentiation allowed under the Equal
Rights Amendment for unique physical characteristics of one sex, such as pregnancy.
An enlightening discussion of BFOQ as it relates to the Equal Rights Amend-
ment and the military was written by Major Henry C. Beans, JAGC, U.S. Army. See,
Beans, Sex Discrimination in the Military, 67 MIL. L. REV. 18 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Sex Discrimination]. Beans also analogizes the BFOQ to exceptions allowed under
the Equal Rights Amendment. BFOQ exceptions are allowed only when the sexual
characteristics are associated with all members of one sex and none of the other, as
compared with characteristics which merely have a high correlation with one sex or
the other. Id. at 43.
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rise to special problems relating to women in combat. The considera-
tions then involve not merely a woman's physical ability to perform
specialized tasks, but the effect of the activity and danger to the fetus.
Unfortunately, the limited amount of research undertaken to date has
yielded evidence and data which is far from conclusive.86
Reliable data from research is conspicuously lacking in the evidence
advanced by those who claim women are physically unfit for combat
duty." There is some evidence to conclude that men, on the average,
possess greater physical strength than women.' Yet, this fact, which
seems at first glance to support the claim that women as a group
are not physically fit for combat duty, is insufficient to justify the
gender-based classification. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,"9 the Court
struck down a statute employing a gender-based classification in spite
of empirical data supporting the assumption underlying the classification.
The underlying assumption of the statutes at issue in Weinberger
was that men were the principle wage earners for their families."
Therefore, men were not eligible for survivors' benefits if their wife
should die, leaving them to care for minor children, whereas women
in a similar situation were entitled to survivors' benefits.91 The Court
noted that there was empirical support for the assumption that men
86. The usual justification for curtailment of physical activity during pregnancy
is that it could have a dangerous effect on the woman and fetus. The validity of this
justification is doubtful. There is evidence that physical exercise actually promotes
an easy labor and hence the birth of a healthy baby. Furthermore, some women athletes
have successfully competed up to a few days before the onsent of labor. BINKIN &
BACH, supra, note 56 at 83. Moreover, the increased availability of safe and efficient
methods of birth control reduces the chances of pregnancy occurring at all. Hale &
Kanowitz, supra, note 65 at 203.
Recent studies have added to the limited information available on menstrua-
tion. The studies center on premenstrual syndrome (PMS) and dysmenorrhea. The
number of women experiencing various degrees of discomfort from either of the two
conditions ranges from 20% to 90%. The crux of the findings is that both conditions
are physiologically-linked, and can be effectively treated with various medications and
hormones.
Some researchers advance a theory explaining the lack of in-depth research
in these two areas. The medical profession has been predominantly male for many
years, a fact which may well account for the limited available evidence and data con-
cerning problems uniquely associated with women.
See generally, BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 83-833; TIME, July 27, 1981
at 59; SCIENCE NEWS, April 4, 1981 at 214; NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1981 at 74; LADIES'
HOME JOURNAL, June, 1981, at 40.
87. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 101.
88. Id. at 82. The principle differences between men and women which ac-
count for this are anthropometric, body composition, and caridiorespiratory factors.
89. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
90. Id. at 644-45.
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were the principle wage earners for their families. The Court cited
statistics which indicated that in over one-half of the families with
both spouses present, the woman was unemployed. Nonetheless, the
Court held the data did not justify the use of the gender-based classifica-
tion, when such a classification denigrated the efforts of women who
did work and significantly contributed to their families' support. 3 Similar-
ly, there are women who could meet the necessary standards for combat
duty,94 and significantly contribute to the defense of their country.
Accordingly, these women should .not have their efforts denigrated
by the statutory gender-based classification that prohibits their assign-
ment to combat positions.
Military witnesses testified before a Senate committee that only
a few women would be able to meet the necessary standards for combat
duty.95 They contended that testing many women to find the qualified
few would create "monumental strains on the training system,"" thus
justifying the general prohibition on assigning women to combat. The
Court rejected a similar justification for statutes prescribing the pay-
ment of survivors' benefits to widows, but not widowers, in Califano
v. Goldfarb.7
In Goldfarb, the statutes required a widower to prove his actual
financial dependence on his wife before being eligible for survivors'
benefits, while a widow was not so required. The assumption underlying
91. Id. at 683.
92. The statistics cited in Weinberger were taken from Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 354 n.7 (1974).
93. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645.
94. Senator Warner conceded that there are women who could meet the
necessary standards for skills, training, and determination; they could fight as well,
if not better, than some men. 126 CONG. REC. S6534 (daily ed. June 10, 1980). See also,
Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64 at 204. Vice Admiral William P. Mack, former
superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy said:
In my estimation, women could serve in any role in the U.S. Navy at
any time if the law restricting women from serving aboard naval vessles
and combat aircraft was changed. They could come to the Naval Academy;
they could pass the course in large number, and do all that's required
of them physically, mentally, professionally, and in any other way, and
there would be little requirement for change in our course curriculum,
physical facilities, or anything of that sort. If the law were changed, in
my mind, women could do anything that men could do, and, in some cases,
perhaps even better.
BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 49.
95. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra, note 56 at 159.
96. Id. This argument was also made in United States v. Reiser, F. Supp. 1060,
1066 (D. Mont. 1975).
97. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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the classification was that men were not financially dependent on their
wives, while women generally were financially dependent on their
husbands. 8 The evidence indicated that 900/o of the women (widows)
affected by the statute were actually dependent on their husbands.9
The government argued that the percentage of women who actually
did correspond to the underlying assumption justified the gender-based
classification. The Court rejected this argument, stating that a 90%
correlation did not justify the use of the gender-based classification."'
A similar argument for prohibiting the assignment of women to
combat positions ought to be rejected. Moreover, there is no evidence
whatsoever that only a few women would qualify for combat duty.0 '
The supposed limitations which would disqualify women from combat
duty are not traceable to any studied evaluations of male and female
capabilities.1 2 The argument that only a few women would qualify for
combat duty, and thus create too much strain on the training system,
is insufficient to justify the gender-based classification employed in
Sections 8549 and 6015.
Very little evidence is advanced to support the belief in women's
physical incapability for combat duty. The lack of well-defined standards
and requirements necessary for the performance of combat duties ' 3
does not allow for objective determination of individual qualification,
for either men or women. Therefore, the question remains whether
women are capable of performing combat duties. The question is not
whether women are or can be trained to achieve the same level of
physical fitness as men, but whether women can meet objective stan-
dards and qualifications necessary to the efficient and adequate perform-
ance of combat duties.
Women's physical ability to meet objective standards and qualifica-
tions necessary in combat positions must also be determined in light
98. Id. at 204. The Court noted that the gender-based classification in the
statutes at issue was indistinguishable from the classificationin Weinberger.
99. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
100. Id. The 90% correlation arguably resulted in a substantial saving to the
government of time and money. But administrative convenience, even to this degree,
was not accepted by the Court as justification for the gender-based classification. Id.
at 217.
101. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. at 1064. Statistics from a 1969 study
by the Bureau of the Census indicated that 56.4% of all black male draftees and 43.1%
of all white male draftees examined for military service were rejected by the military.
Yet, it has never been suggested that all blacks be exempted from service on the
basis of these facts. Id. at 1067.
102. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. at 295.
103. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
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of the changed nature of combat. The emphasis of combat duty has
shifted from a match of brute strength to a more efficient use of
technological strength."4 There are many jobs of logistics and combat
support within combat zones."°5 These jobs are no different nor are
they more difficult than the work performed by women in noncombat
zones.'
06
In previous years, soliders of standing armies primarily fought
hand-to-hand combat,0 7 which included transporting heavy weapons
on long marches.' 8 Today's combat soldiers are equipped with very
sophisticated weaponry, demanding less physical prowess."9 Combat
soldiers are required to carry loads weighing 40 to 50 pounds, which
many women are capable of handling."' Furthermore, piloting aircraft
and engaging in naval operations are classified as combat duty."' These
assignments are not classified as combat because of the strength re-
quired to perform them, rather it is because of the dangerous conditions
under which performance is necessary."'
The conditions of combat duty have changed. This condition is
reflected in modern airpower and automatic weapons, as well as in
the increasing need for larger support infrastructures."3 The assump-
tion that women are too weak to effectively participate in combat
needs to be re-evaluated in light of these changes. The outdated method
of warfare from another era is hardly a legitimate consideration, let
alone controlling precedent, when confronting today's issues.'"
104. 117 CONG. REC. H35, 786 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman
Gude). At least one article states that: "the most important factor facilitating the ef-
fective use of women in the armed forces is the technological revolution in warfare
.... Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64 at 203. "[Tiechnology would seem to be moving
toward making the traditional warrior obsolete and the technician all important." Id.
105. 117 CONG. REC. H35, 798 (daily ed. Oct, 12, 1971) (remakrs of Congressman
Drinan).
106. Id. See also BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 4, indicating that contem-
porary military institutions demand larger support infrastructures than did previous
armies.
107. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 4; Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64 at
203; Brown, Emerson, supra note 28, at 967.
108. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 967.
109. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 4. The use of bombs and high-powered
guns minimize the required strength and maximize the needed precision and
technological ability. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64 at 203.
110. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 977.
111. Id.
112. This argument goes more to the idea that women need to be protected
from the dangers and cruelty of war. See infra notes 182-243 and accompanying text.
113. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. at 1067.
114. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64 at 206.
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The assumption that women are physically unfit for combat duty
is not supported by the relevant evidence. The tests utilized by the
armed services are inadequate and inconsistently administered."' The
outdated conception of the nature of combat necessities a redefinition
of combat duty."' Therefore, the degree to which the blanket generaliza-
tion that all women are physically unfit for combat correlates with the
facts is not substantial, and cannot serve to justify this component
of the military necessity objective.
2. Group Dynamics, Morale, and Discipline
One of the major objections to the assignment of women to combat
is that the actual performance of sexually mixed units is unknown,
and would present a serious risk to the security of the nation during
a war. This is a legitimate concern. However, the logic behind the
following quotation from S. Rep. No. 96-826 remains elusive. "Register-
ing women for assignment to combat or assigning women to combat
positions in peacetime then would leave the actual performance of
sexually mixed units as an experiment to be conducted in war with
unknown risks... ""' The alternatives are to assign women to combat
positions during a war (which is the exact problem of which opponents
complain), or to prohibit the assignment completely. The latter alter-
native is not going to increase the armed services' knowledge about
the performance of sexually mixed units. Therefore it is not a solution
to the problem. As stated in the Senate Report, the problem of lack
of knowledge admits of no solution. The argument is circular and self-
serving. By providing no possible means of solving the problem, this
argument will be used indefinitely to oppose the assignment of women
to combat. Peacetime assignment of women to combat units would
allow the services to simulate combat conditions in a controlled environ-
ment. Admittedly, this would not be an exact substitute for data
generated by actual combat performance. But it would indicate problem
areas, if any existed. The armed services could then deal with those
problems and experiment with possible solutions. Furthermore, the
evidence generated by preliminary studies and experiments indicates
that the concern over group performance and interaction may not be
as well-founded as would first appear.
Two theories of group performance are discussed. Depending on
which theory is taken as normative, the integration of women into
previously all-male units may have a more or less debilitating effect
115. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text
117. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 56 at 157.
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on combat effectiveness. The evidence of women's performance in
previous wars, as well as in a recent Navy experiment is examined
to determine which theory is better supported by the data.
The Department of the Navy subscribes to the theory which holds
that there is a biological basis for bonding between men.118 This bonding
occurs especially in instances of politics, war, and police-work,1 9 ac-
tivities from which women traditionally have been excluded. Further-
more, the exclusively male character is a significant factor for many
of the men who are attracted to these activities.1 ' The implications
of the bonding theory are significant for combat performance.
The implications for combat effectiveness subsequent to an inte-
gration of women are twofold. First, the type of men likely to volunteer
for traditionally male-dominated units, (particularly airborne and ranger
units or combat units assigned to warships) or remain in the Navy
on a career basis, may decide not to do so as a result of the women's
presence."' Second, the close bonding and teamwork necessary between
soldiers would not be achieved or maintained. The bonding between
men would be disrupted and bonding between men and women would
not occur at all.122
118. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 90.
119. Id. These activities share the common characteristic of aggressiveness.
New research tends to support the biological link with aggressive behavior. The
biological basis advanced relies on hormones and the corresponding neurochemical pro-
cesses. However, this theory is far from conclusive. Many scientists and researchers
reject it as merely another example of sexual stereotyping reinforced by a male-
dominated culture. An excellent discussion can be found in NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1981,
at 72.
120. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 90.
121. Id. at 90-91. In 1975, then Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Worth
Bagley, stated:
Since the inception of the Continental Navy, later the U.S. Navy, tradi-
tional male combination of warfare and seafaring has continued. Only
recently has there been pressure for change. The naval profession-
specifically the business of going to sea-has been advertised as, and ac-
cepted as, a closed club for men. The present male-dominated, sea-going
facet of Navy life is one that is understood and accepted by the country
and the men in the Navy. Men join the Navy for many different reasons;
however, a certain portion join and remain in the Navy because they en-
joy being in a job which has been historically associated with fellowship
among men in a difficult and dangerous endeavor. Changing the fabric
of the Navy by integrating women into all combat roles might well reduce
the attractions of the Navy to this segment of mankind, as well as to
some of those men who might, in the future, join the Navy and make
it a career.
Id. at 91.
122. Id. at 90.
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The bonding theory can be critisized on two grounds. First, the
Navy's arguments'23 seem more cultural than biological. The traditional
pattern of male dominance, especially in military matters, is manifested
by the Navy's opposition to female encroachment into the "combat
clique," the essence of the military establishment.'24 Second, this theory
does not take account of the presence of women in international ter-
rorist groups, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and
the Baader-Meinhof Gang, 2 ' where male bonding would likely exist.
To the extent that male bonding may not be relevant in combat
situations, the second theory of group performance stresses the in-
dividual's self-interest, where the emphasis is on each person's survival
instinct.2 ' This theory seems to account for the effectiveness of women
in terrorist organizations. Moreover, it is supported by evidence of
women who have fought in combat both in this country and other
countries. The most notable examples of women engaging in combat
are the experiences of Russian women in World War II,L ' Israel's use
of women in the War of Liberation in 1948,18 and women in the Viet
Cong.2 9 World War II was the turning point in United States history
concerning women in the armed services.30 Women flew combat aircraft,
123. See supra note 121.
124. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 48.
125. Id. at 91.
126. Id. at 92.
127. At least one million Russian women participated in World War II. The
women served with ground combat units, performing the duties of tank crewmembers,
machine gunners, snipers, and artillery crewmembers. They served in air defense units,
the most notable being the 58th Women's Aircraft Regiment, the Forty-Sixth Night
Bomber Regiment, and the 125th Day Bomber Regiment. The women were used as
scouts, snipers, and saboteurs with the partisan forces. They were trained in schools
to fight side-by-side with the regular forces. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56, 123-25.
128. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 977. Women's roles in the Israeli army
began before the War of Liberation in 1948. It began in the Haganah, the illegal Jewish
army which existed prior to the creation of the State. In the first phase of the War
of Liberation, women fought side-by-side with men in active and defensive battles.
Women were even parachuted in Nazi-occupied countries during World War II to
organize Jewish self-defense. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 13, 131-34.
129. Brown, Emerson, supra note 38 at 977. Former Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral R. Zumwalt said, "[women should] have the opportunity to ... go into combat
. . * and as far as women soldiers are concerned, when I was in Southeast Asia dur-
ing the Vietnam War I found that among the most vicious fighters were the Viet
Cong women." BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 50. It should be noted however, that
Admiral Zumwalt is not in the majority with Navy traditionalists.
130. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 7. There are instances of women
fighting along side of men during the Revolution and the Civil War. However, many
of these women were disguised as men. Therefore, the performances of the "mixed
units" is not helpful in assessing male attitudes and behavior in sexually mixed units.
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followed the invasions of North Africa and Normandy, and to a smaller
extent, were involved in the war in the Pacific.1"1 This evidence seems
to indicate that when the basic facts of life-and-death are confronted,
the gender of comrades-in-arms pales in significance.
The evidence of women's performance in combat also indicates
that women are capable of being highly disciplined under combat condi-
tions. Combat requires the unnatural behavior of advancing into hostile
and potentially lethal fire.'32 To ensure the occurrance of this behavior
when necessary, the armed services train a soldier to act without hesita-
tion on the orders of a superior.'3 The Army states that the purpose
of basic training is to turn civilians into soldiers who are, among other
things, well-disciplined and highly motivated.' This indicates that the
discipline required by the Army is a learned characteristic.
To the extent that "Army discipline" is learned by an individual,
evidence and research indicates that the learning process is greatly
facilitated by the possession of a high school diploma. It is believed
that a high school graduate adapts more readily to the demands of
military life,13' and poses far fewer disciplinary problems than an indi-
vidual who is not a high school graduate. The possession of a high
school diploma indicates more than a particular ability to the armed
services. Over the years, research established an inverse relationship
between the level of education and the instances of disciplinary prob-
lems. An individiual possessing a high school diploma attests to the
fact that he or she has the ability to adjust to a routine and to some
degree of discipline. 3 Statistics from the fiscal years 1971-1976 reveal
that on the average, 92.8% of the enlisted women, compared with
64.65% of the enlisted men, had high school degrees.' Accordingly,
It does seem to indicate that the women had no problems fighting side-by-side with
the men. Furthermore, this suggests that even disregarding the advanced technological
warfare of the present, women can serve as soliders in combat units. An excellent
discussion of women fighting in wars prior to World War II can be found in M.
TREADWELL, THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS 3-18 (1954) [hereinafter cited as THE WOMEN'S
ARMY CORPS].
131. See generally, THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS; BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56
at 7-9.
132. P. BARNES, PAWNS: THE PLIGHT OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER 59 (1972).
133. Id. at 61. A similar statement was expressed by retired Rear Admiral
Arnold E. True, "Our Army [in Vietnam] fights only because of discipline. Id. at 59.
134. Id. at 59. Accord, ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1546.'
135. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 56 at 115-16; BINKIN & BACH, supra, note
56 at 74.
136. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 74.
137. Id. at 75.
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it would seem that the women were at least as trainable, if not more
so, than the men.
Additional evidence supporting the fact that women can be highly
disciplined and work well with men is available from an experiment,
undertaken by the Navy in 1972, which integrated men and women
aboard the ship U.S.S. Sanctuary. The experiment lasted for thirteen
months with forty-two nonconsecutive days at sea.13 The Sanctuary's
commanding officer, in evaluating the experiment, said, [wiomen can
perform every shipboard function with equal ease, expertise, and dedica-
tion as men do."'139 However, some morale and disciplinary problems
were encountered.
With respect to the morale and disciplinary problems, the twelve
consecutive days at sea gave rise to public displays of affection, 4' having
a demoralizing effect on other crew members, both men and women.'
As a result, discipline and the good order of the ship were adversely
affected." However, the commanding officer's evaluation went on to
state that the problem was immediately corrected by the issuance
of a policy forbidding public and open displays of affection.' The problem
was handled in a simple manner and in a short period of time. The
report further stated that the men welcomed the women because the
women gave some semblence of normal social relations.' It would
seem that the problem of morality between shipmates is not as awesome
as opponents of women combatants would like to believe.'45
The commander's report of the experiment's results is encourag-
ing. The fact that the Navy undertook this type of experiment at all
signifies that the Navy is beginning to investigate and research the
effects of sexual integration. The facts show that the obstacles of morale
and discipline disruption are not insurmountable. Commanders have
sufficient authority to deal with individual crew members having trou-
138. Id. at 93. However, the most days consecutively spent at sea was twelve.
139. Id. This evaluation did not apply to engineering since there was no available
experience on which to base a judgment. Accord, 126 CONG. REC. S6528 (daily ed. June
10, 1980) (remarks of Senator Cohen).
140. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 94. The commander's report does not
elaborate on the kind of public affection which occurred during the period at sea.
141. Id.
142. Id. Again, the report is silent as to the specific instances where public
displays of affection had a detrimental effect on the discipline and good order of the
ship. The report merely states that the situation was becoming "serious." Id.
143. Id.
144. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56, at 94.
145. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 977. The easy resolution of the problem
indicates that women can obey orders and conform to standards of discipline.
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ble adjusting to a sexually integrated unit.146 The evidence indicates
that the women's presence was simply another fact of life with which
the crew members had to deal.'47
Yet, the evidence generated by the experiment is somewhat limited.
The total number of days at sea was only approximately ten percent
of the entire length of the experiment.' 8 In addition, the wives of
male shipboard personnel were strongly opposed to the assignment
of women, possibly affecting men's decisions concerning naval careers.'49
Despite these limitations, the Sanctuary experiment provides useful
guidelines for further research and experiments of this type."
The Sanctuary experiment and accounts of women combatants
in the world's previous wars provide the sparse and inconclusive evidence
concerning the performance of sexually integrated units. The quantity
and quality of the evidence is analogous to that advanced in the physical
capability component 5 ' of the military necessity objective. If anything,
the available evidence supports the converse of the opponents' argument.
Since the government bears the burden of proving that the evidence
substantially supports the use of the gender-based classification, 5 ' and
there is little or no evidence to support the use of the classification
in Sections 8549 and 6015, this component of the military necessity
objective must also fail the second test of the middle-tier standard
of review.
3. Economics
Opponents of women combatants have argued that the integration
of women into combat units would increase the costs of the military,
and thereby weaken the national security.'53 Since the military operates
146. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. at 309.
147. Id.
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 94. See also, Sex Discrimination, supra
note 85 at 49, analogizing a BFOQ case in which an employer had a policy against
a female truck drivers sharing driver assignments with male truck drivers. The employer
defended the policy by pointing to complaints made by wives of the male truck drivers.
The justification was insufficient to support a BFOQ exception.
150. The Army is also undertaking experiments to determine the ability of
sexually mixed units to adequately perform their duties. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note
56 at 95.
151. See supra notes 67-116 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
153. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 71.
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on a budget, if money is spent on adjustments required for sexual
integration, then less money can be spent on maintaining the necessary
level of efficiency, training, and preparedness. These increased costs
can be categorized in two groups: 1) one-time adjustment costs and
2) costs associated with benefits paid to military personnel and their
dependents.
The major argument focuses on the one-time adjustment costs
associated with modifying or constructing housing facilities."M The armed
services must modify existing facilities or construct new facilities in
order to accommodate soldiers' privacy rights.'" The Supreme Court
recently recognized an individual's constitutional right to privacy,156
and interpreted this right as requiring separate living quarters for
members of the opposite sex." 7 There are instances when this would
justify the exclusion of one sex from particular situations. However,
a general prohibition of women from all combat at any and all times
cannot be supported by this reasoning.'" Privacy rights would (or should)
be the least of a combat soldier's concerns. It is hardly conceivable
that an individual, when faced with the life-and-death consequences
routinely confronted in a combat situation, would be overly concerned
with the prospect of sharing sleeping quarters with or undressing in
front of a member of the opposite sex. When an individual's life is
at stake, such concerns tend to lose the significance they take on in
other non-life-threatening situations."9
154. Id. at 53.
155. A letter written by William H. Rehnquist, while serving with the Depart-
ment of Justice, stated that most combat situations would not allow for separate lavatory
facilities or living quarters, thus violating the privacy rights of the soldiers. 118 CONG.
REC. S9344 (daily ed.)
156. The Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy in 1965. In Griswold
v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 479 (1965) (a doctor, convicted of giving advice and birth con-
trol devices to a married couple, brought suit challenging the Connecticut statute's
constitutionality), the Court stated that the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras which create zones of privacy. The "sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms," Id. at 485, are within the zones of privacy created by the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the Constitution.
157. The right was confirmed in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). One
part of the right is to be free from official coercion in sexual relations. Id. at 453.
This has further been interpreted as not requiring individuals to expose their persons
or perform intimate bodily functions in the presence of members of the opposite sex.
Thus, segregated living quarters would be required in the armed services. Brown,
Emerson, supra note 28 at 900-01. See also, ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at
1544-46; 117 CONG. REC. H9365 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman Ryan).
158. ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1551.
159. A woman officer/faculty member at West Point stated, "As for that business
1983]
Cramsie: Gender Discrimination in the Military: The Unconstitutional Excus
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
572 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
Conceding that separate living quarters may be necessary, in
most instances, soldiers' privacy rights can be accommodated by modify-
ing the present use of existing facilities, together with some type of
renovation. 6 ' This same type of space evaluation has been occurring
nation-wide on college and university campuses. 6 ' It is unclear why
the military would not similarly be able to alter its present structures
to accommodate men and women.6 2 The argument that providing separate
quarters for men and women would cost the military too much money
was rejected in Owens v. Brown.6 ' The court stated that Navy ships
are periodically refitted and modernized to take account of changing
needs,' and therefore providing men and women with separate quarters
and facilities would pose no serious problems for the Navy."6 Thus,
ensuring the privacy rights of individuals, while at the same time keep-
ing this one-time cost to a minimum, may not be an insurmountable
problem.
Another one-time adjustment cost, the redesigning of clothing
and equipment, must be considered. Many modifications in uniforms
and boots have already been undertaken. 6 The redesigning of equip-
ment has more significant implications, however. Generally, the Army
designs its equipment for men with anthropometric dimensions ranging
from the fifth to the ninety-fifth percentiles of all men.6 7 In many
ways the average woman measures significantly less than the average
man,'6 8 and thus does not fit within the percentile range. This difference
about men and women sharing foxholes, if you are next to a male in a foxhole in
a combat situation and you need to urinate or change your Tampax, you'll just go
ahead and do it." Another woman added, "Why, I'd just bleed right through." LIFE,
Sept. 1981, at 74.
160. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 54.
161. ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1546.
162. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 54.
163. 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
164. Id. at 309.
165. Id.
166. LIFE, Sept. 1981, at 69, 76. The uniforms issued to women were basically
the same as those issued to men. The uniforms were altered to provide comfort and
easy movement. The women, however, were issued boots originally designed for nurses.
The kind of activity an individual in basic training is required to undergo differs vastly
from that of a nurse. These boots are no longer issued; women receive male boots.
A new boot, appropriate for all soliders is currently being tested.
167. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 54. Percentile figures are based upon
a division into 100 equal, consecutive groups. For instance, if a man is in the 97th
percentile, three out of every 100 men measure more than he does, and 96 out of
100 measure less than he does.
168. Id. Anthropometric dimensions of the general population show that women
between the ages of 18 and 24 weigh about 54% less than a man at the fifth percen-
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is crucial in safe and efficient use of dangerous and complex equipment. 9
Hence, the cost of redesigning equipment to accommodate women may
be substantial. It should be noted, however, that equipment costs are
often increased due to a design which is needed for larger and heavier
soldiers. 7' Since the average woman is significantly smaller than the
average man, in the long run the cost of equipment designed to accom-
modate female soldiers may be less than the cost of equipment designed
to accommodate male soldiers. Thus, the net cost of redesigning equip-
ment for women soldiers is speculative.
While redesigning equipment for women soldiers may be costly,
the benefits paid to female personnel are actually less than the benefits
paid to male personnel. These benefits include housing costs or cash
allowances for housing, medical, and travel costs. 7' Most of these costs
are higher when the military person is married with dependent children,72
and 36/o fewer women than men are married with dependent children.
tile in the same age group. Sixty percent of the women are shorter, 30% have a shorter
sitting height, and about one-half have a shorter popliteal height.
169. Weight, stature, sitting height, eye height, popliteal height (floor to thigh
while seated), functional reach, and foot length are the critical dimensions for the
redesigning of equipment. Id.
170. Id. at 55. For instance, tanks or aircraft designed for men often require
more space to safely accommodate the crewmembers. The increased size and weight
of the equipment would require a more powerful engine to achieve the same max-
imum speed that is required of a smaller and lighter plane or tank. The larger size
of the equipment as well as the more powerful engine often increase the costs of
production.
171. Id. at 56.
172. Military personnel usually live in quarters provided by the military. Single
individuals generally live in barracks similar to college dormitories. Married person-
nel are provided with housing in apartments, townhouses, or homes. The costs of provid-
ing and maintaining singles' housing are much less than those associated with living
accommodations for married personnel and their families.
If there are no government-provided facilities, the government disburses a
monthly cash-quarters allowance. The amount paid depends on the individual's marital
and dependency status, and rank. In May, 1977, the average difference in the quarters
allowance of those with and without dependents was $52 per month. Since 36% fewer
, omen have dependents, they are less costly per year to the military than men.
Most medical benefits paid each year are dependents' expenses. Women have
1.16 fewer dependents than men in the military. Therefore, the government spends
more money for medical support for the male personnel in the military.
Travel costs include the cost of relocating an individual when reassigned. Costs
due to shipping weights of household goods and incidental expenses such as hotels
and gas, are paid for by the government. Not surprisingly, these costs are much less
for a single person than they are for a married person with dependents. In 1977, the
average cost of relocating a woman, including all shipping costs and incidental ex-
penses, was approximately $407 less than the average cost of relocating a man. This
was due to the differences in the proportions of personnel with dependents. Id. at 55-58.
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In recent years, however, an increasing percentage of women volunteers
are married.173 If this trend continues, the difference in annual costs
for men and women may well diminish.1 7' Even if the difference in
annual costs to the military were to disappear completely, that is,
that the cost in terms of benefits would be the same for men and
women, it is still not possible to argue successfully that a greater
number of women in the armed services would be too costly, and thus
threaten the national security.
Taken in total, opponents of women combatants argue that the
integration of women into all areas of the armed services will increase
the costs of the military, and thus weaken the national security. The
one-time adjustment costs associated with living quarters and the
redesign of equipment and uniforms may be substantial, 75 but the
statistics and data to support this hypothesis are incomplete and
speculative. In addition, these expenses occur only once, and remedying
inequality normally does cost money.176 Moreover, the annual cost to
the military in terms of benefits paid to personnel is actually less
for female personnel than for male personnel.1 7 Data which proved
that the underlying assumption of a gender-based classification was
correct 90% of the time, was rejected by the Supreme Court as insuffi-
cient to support the gender-based classification in Goldfarb."8 Therefore,
it is highly unlikely that the incomplete and speculative evidence here
advanced will be sufficient to support the third component of the argu-
ment that women will cost the military too much money, and thus
threaten the national security.
The middle-tier standard of review requires a statutory gender-
based classification to substantially further an important governmental
objective.'" The objective of military necessity is an important govern-
mental objective.' However, the blanket prohibition against the assign-
ment of women to combat positions used in Sections 8549 and 6015
does not substantially further the objective of military necessity. The
173. Id. at 17, 58.
174. The diminution in the cost differential would be due to the differences
in maintaining single and married personnel. See supra notes 171-73 and accompany-
ing text.
175. See supra notes 154-70 and accompanying text.
176. Sex Discrimination, supra note 85 at 50.
177. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. In 1977, the total difference
in annual benefits paid to men and women was $982 each. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note
56 at 58.
178. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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sweep of the statutes is too broad. The blanket exclusion of women
from combat positions is clearly over-inclusive. The gender-based
classification presumes women are unfit physically and mentally for
combat duty, and therefore excludes all women, even those who can
demonstrate their combat fitness.181 The military has advanced no
evidence to prove that the gender-based classification used in the combat
statutes is more effective than a gender-neutral classification in pro-
moting the important governmental objective. In fact, the available
evidence is inconclusive, incomplete, and speculative as to all three
components of the military necessity objective. Therefore, under the
middle-tier standard of review, the gender-based classification which
completely prohibits the assignment of all women to combat and combat-
related positions does not substantially further the important govern-
mental objective of military necessity in a manner consistent with
the command of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Thus,
the statutes that prohibit the assignment of women to combat and
combat-related positions are constitutionally infirm.
B. The Protection of Women
The protection of women from the brutality and carnage of war"2
is the second governmental objective sought to be furthered by the
gender-based classification in Sections 8549 and 6015. The argument
that women need to be protected by men is based on the centuries-old
belief that men are the stronger sex and hence the protectors of
women." " The argument is part of a past which reflects a pattern
181. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), the Court refused to accept
a blanket exclusionary classification which denied all servicemen stationed in Texas
the right to vote. Id. at 96. The state's justification was the objective of promoting
responsible voting only by allowing residents and citizens of the state to vote. Id.
at 95. The Court accepted this objective. However, the statutory classification estab-
lished a nonrebuttable presumption of nonresidence. The presumption was conclusive
and was "incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character." Id.
at 96, quoting Heimer v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 324 (1931). The Court found this classifica-
tion violated the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed in the fourteenth
amendment.
182. During congressional debates concerning an Equal Rights Amendment,
Senator Cellar stated,
Women represent motherhood and creation. Wars are for destruction.
Women, integrated with men in the carnage and slaughter of battle-on
land, at sea or in the air-is unthinkable. .... Men could refuse to serve
and sacrifice in the butchery of war if women are exempt. Can you im-
agine women trained by a drill sergeant to charge the enemy with fixed
bayonets and bombs? . . . War is Death's feast. It is enough that men
attend.
117 CONG. REC. H35, 785 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971).
183. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
1983]
Cramsie: Gender Discrimination in the Military: The Unconstitutional Excus
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
576 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
of male dominance.18 ' It is based on the outdated and stereotypical
notion that a woman's proper place is in the home." This argument
can be summed up with the words "romantic paternalism."'8
The middle-tier standard of review requires a determination of
whether the objective of protecting women is an important governmen-
tal objective. Analysis of the paternalistic notion of women's need for
protection focuses the inquiry on four different assumptions advanced
to support that objective. First, a woman is the center of the home.
Second, a woman is entitled to the benefits and privileges of citizenship,
but not subject to the responsibilities and duties. Third, the horror of
war and the corresponding risk of capture are not to be confronted
by women. Finally, this society, generally, is not ready for women
to assume active roles in combat.
The belief that a woman is the center of the home enjoys wide
support,'87 despite evidence to the contrary.8 ' The Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the assumption that women are the center of the
home as a justification for gender-based classifications. In Stanton v.
Stanton,'89 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to a
Utah statutory scheme establishing the ages 18 and 21 as the ages
of majority for females and males, respectively.' The issue arose in
the context of a father's obligation for support payments for his children.
The mother contended that the statute discriminated against the daughter
since she received no support payments from her father after she
reached age 18, whereas the son continued to receive support payments
until he was 21 years old. The age differential was based on the notion
that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a
home and its essentials . .. that it is a salutary thing for him to get
a good education and/or training before he undertakes those respon-
184. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 39,
185. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 872. Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64
at 205; 126 CONG. REC. S6543 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Senator Leahy);
Stanton v. Stanton, 420 U.S. at 15; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283.
186. The practical effects of romantic paternalism are not to put women on
a pedestal, but in a cage. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 684. See also, Brown,
Emerson, supra note 28 at 872; 126 CONG. REC. S6543 (daily ed. June 10, 1980)
(remarks of Senator Leahy); BINKIN & BACH, supra note 56 at 48.
187. See supra note 185.
188. As of 1974, 43% of all married women were employed outside the home.
The employment rate of all women between the ages of 20 and 54 was 56/0. Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 238 n.7 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In 1974, the percent-
age of working married women had risen to 44%. Furthermore, women composed nearly
40% of the entire labor force. Krauskopf, supra note 40 at 82.
189. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
190. Id. at 9.
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sibilities .... that girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally,
and mentally before boys . . . and that they generally tend to marry
earlier ... ."' The state argued that these assumptions justified requir-
ing support payments for a male until the age of 21 in order that
he may obtain an education.
The Court expressly rejected this justification for the majority
age differential. Recognizing that women are "[n]o longer ... destined
solely for the home and the rearing of family, and only the male[s]
for the marketplace and world of ideas,"'9 the Court took judicial notice
of women's presence in business and in professional occupations.' 9
Therefore, "under any test - compelling state interest, or rational basis,
or something in between- . .94 in the context of child support,
the gender-based classification did not survive an equal protection attack.
Similarly, in the context of alimony payments, a gender-based
classification requiring a husband, but never a wife, to pay alimony
was struck down. In Orr v. Orr,'95 a husband challenged an Alabama
statute which conclusively exempted a woman from ever paying alimony,
while a man may have been obligated to pay alimony to his ex-wife. 96
The state's objective was the reinforcement of a belief about family
responsibilities under which the wife played a dependent role.'97 Relying
on Stanton, the Court rejected such an objective as an important govern-
mental objective and stated that "[legislative classifications which
distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the in-
herent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper place' of
women and their need for special protection."'9
A corollary to the belief that women are the center of the home
is that compelling a woman to serve in combat would disrupt the family
unit, and place unprecedented strains on family life.'99 The claim that
a mother's absence disrupts the family cannot be denied. But it seems
equally clear that a father's absence has a detrimental effect on the
family as well. The disruption is caused by the absence of a parent
and the lack of that parent's contributions, whether those contributions
are of a maternal or paternal nature. The belief that a mother's love,
191. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 14-15.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 17.
195, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
196. Id. at 270 n.1.
197. Id. at 279.
198. Id. at 283.
199. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 56 at 159.
19831
Cramsie: Gender Discrimination in the Military: The Unconstitutional Excus
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
578 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
care, affection, and discipline are significantly more important to the
family than the father's degrades the father by failing to take account
of his importance and by implicitly asserting his minimal value to the
family unit.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that there exists a
fundamental difference between maternal and paternal relations, that
"'a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer rela-
tionship with her child ... than a father does.' "" In Caban v. Mohamnwd, '
a New York statute which permitted an unwed mother, but not an
unwed father, to block the adoption of their child simply by withholding
her consent,"2 was challenged on the ground that it employed a gender-
based classification which discriminated against unwed fathers. The
objective of the statute was to further the interests of illegitimate
children by removing a possible barrier to their adoption.0 3
This asserted governmental objective was accepted by the Court
as an important governmental objective. However, the Court held that
the gender-based classification, which rested on the assumption that
mothers have closer relationships with their children than do fathers,
did not substantially further that objective."4 The facts established
that both the father and the mother had a substantial relationship
with the children."' The Court stated that "maternal and paternal
roles are not invariably different in importance. Even if ... mothers
as a class were closer . . . than fathers to their newborn infants,
this generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less
acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child
increased.""° Therefore, the broad gender-based classification is not
supported by the belief in a difference between maternal and paternal
relations. The Supreme Court has similarly recognized the rights of
fathers by stating that a father, no less than a mother, has a right
to "the companionship, care, custody, and management of the children"
he has sired and raised, which "undeniably warrants deference, and
200. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979).
201. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
202. Id. at 385-87.
203. Id. at 391.
204. Id. at 394.
205. Id. at 389. In Caban, the mother and father of the children, though un-
married to each other, lived with each other and the children as a family for five
years. The controversy occurred when the couple separated and the mother took the
children, petitioning the state for their adoption. (Both parents had remarried). The
father was unable to stop the adoption unless he could prove the mother was un unfit
parent.
206. Id.
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absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." ' 7 Presumably
then, love, care, companionship and affection are not characteristics
solely belonging to mothers.
Parental relationships with children, and parental contributions
to the family are not readily distinguishable on the basis of whether
the relationship and contributions are of a maternal or paternal
character."'O It seems clear that the sudden lack of such a relationship
disrupts the family unit. The gender-based classification in Sections
8549 and 6015 prohibits the assignment of women to combat on the
ground that a mother's absence will disrupt the family unit, implying
that a father's absence will not disrupt the family unit in the same
degree. In light of Stanley and Caban, this justification for the general
prohibition against women in combat positions is unacceptable and
cannot maintain the gender-based classification against an equal protec-
tion challenge.
The second aspect of the argument that women need protection
is that women are entitled to enjoy the benefits and privileges of citizen-
ship without being subject to the responsibilities and duties.0 9 This
argument is inconsistent with basic notions of equality. Equal rights
means equal responsibilities.210 The Supreme Court stated, "the duty
of citizens ... to defend our government against all enemies whenever
necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the Constitution. 21 ' To
207. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (Illinois statute which employed
the presumption that unwed fathers of children whose mother had died were unfit
and neglectful parents, while proof of unwed mothers' unfitness was required before
the children were declared state wards, held invalid).
208. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
209. Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 887, 908.
210. See Ginsburg, The Status of Women, 20 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 585 (1972); 116
CONG. REC. H35, 450 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (remarks of Congressman Bayh); Hale &
Kanowitz, supra note 64 at 200.
211. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929). The facts of Schwim-
mer are interesting in the context of this Note. Ms. Schwimmer was a 49 year old
citizen of Hungary. She desired to become a citizen of the United States and made
a proper application. Her application was denied on the grounds that she was not
attached to the principles of the Constitution. Id. at 652. This conclusion rested on
the fact that Ms. Schwimmer was a pacifist and therefore would not take arms in
defense of the United States. The Court stated that the duty to defend the country
was a fundamental principle of the Constitution, and therefore denied Ms. Schwimmer
citizenship.
From the opinion, it is clear that the Court was concerned with the world events
of the previous 15 years. The fear of Bolshevism had permeated the consciousness
of the United States, and the Court was reacting to that. Schenk v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), is one example of the fear experienced by the United States during
that period of history. The fact that Ms. Schwimmer, a woman over 50 years old,
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contribute to the defense of the nation is a fundamental civic obligation;"
it is participation in an essential national enterprise."' To categorically
exclude women, citizens, from this participation is to deny them the
opportunity and duty to carry their share of the defense of the nation."4
Analogously, sharing in the administration of justice is a phase
of civic responsibility,"5 thereby making jury service a duty as well
as a privilege of citizenship.21 In Taylor v. Louisiana,1 7 a state statute
excluded women from jury service unless the woman had previously
filed a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury duty."8
That state's objective behind this requirement was to regulate and
provide stability to the state's idea of family life. The state's idea
of family life included the belief that women, as a class, served a distinc-
tive role in society and that jury service would substantially interfere
with that function.219
The Court rejected the belief that women serve a distinctive role
in society with which jury service would substantially interfere.22
Recognizing that a similar justification had been upheld by the Court
fourteen years earlier in Hoyt v. Florida,22 the Court stated that "[i]f
it was ever the case that women were unqualified to sit on juries
was unable by law to bear arms was irrelevant in the opinion of the Court. The con-
cern was that she would advocate her views and encourage other individuals to adopt
them.
Justice Holmes dissented, with Justice Brandeis concurring in his opinion. Much
of the dissent dealt with matters unrelated to this Note, but Justice Holmes did say
that the adequacy of Ms. Schwimmer's oath as a citizen could hardly be affected by
her statement concerning the defense of the United States, inasmuch as she was a
woman over 50 years of age and unable to bear arms even if she had so desired.
212. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. at 295.
214. 117 CONG. REC. H35, 784 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman
Gude).
215. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (a federal court jury
panel from which persons who work for a daily wage were intentionally and
systematically excluded held unlawfully constituted).
216. Id. at 224.
217. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
218. Id. at 523. This requirement was provided for in both the Louisiana Con-
stitution and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
219. Id. at 533.
220. Id. at 534-35. The Court said, "[ilt is untenable to suggest these days that
it would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service
or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties." (Emphasis in the
original).
221. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). The state objective in Hoyt was based on the assump-
tion that "woman is still regarded as the center of the home and family life." Id. at 62.
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or were so situated that none of them should be required to perform
jury service, that time has long since passed." '222 The Court noted the
societal changes, encompassing both a higher degree of sensitivity to
gender-based classifications and the changing nature and structure
of the family unit,223 that had occurred in the intervening fourteen
years since the Hoyt decision.
Exclusion of a class of citizens comprising 53% of the eligible
jurors was held incompatible with the fourteenth amendment. 4 Societal
changes required the Court to re-examine the validity of the assumption
underlying the state's objective. The Court concluded that community
participation in the administration of the law was consistent with the
democratic heritage of the United States.225
Democracy contemplates full, informed and active participation
in society. Active involvement is predicated upon a sense of commit-
ment and responsibility.227 If women are similarly denied participation
in a national defense effort, and excluded from the responsibility of
combat duty, their sense of committment and meaningful contribution
to the relevant decisions are necessarily diminished. Men and women
should jointly determine the course of their history.228
If serving in combat for the defense of the nation is viewed as
the most burdensome and onerous responsibility of citizenship, then
it is discriminatory against men to categorically exclude women on
the basis of gender.229 Requiring a man to sacrifice his personal freedom
and safety for the defense of the nation, when a woman possessing
the same qualifications is not required to make the sacrifice, is inconsis-
tent with egalitarian principles. The obligation of serving in the armed
services should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of
selection which is fair and just.2"'
222. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 537.
223. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 538.
225. Id. at 530. The Court continued by saying that community participation
in the administration of the criminal law is critical to public confidence in the fairness
of the criminal justice system.
226. 126 CONG. REC. S6530 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Senator Cohen).
227. Id. See also, Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 968-69; Hale & Kanowitz,
supra note 64 at 215-16.
228. 117 CONG. REC. H 35, 787 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Con-
gressman Gude).
229. 117 CONG. REC. H35, 786 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman
Gude); Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 968; Sex Discrimination, supra note 85 at
70; United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. at 1062.
230. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. at 1062. The Court quoted the con-
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The obligation and duty of serving in the armed services is a
concomitant to the privileges of citizenship. There once may have been
a valid justification for excluding women from certain duties associated
with citizenship, but those justifications must be critically re-examined
in light of the changes in society. Citizenship in a democratic nation
requires burdens and benefits to be shared by all qualified and capable
citizens. Therefore, the notion that women can selectively participate
in the duties and privileges of citizenship cannot support the objective
of the protection of women from the brutality of war.
The third argument relied on by advocates of women's protection
is that women should not be exposed to the horrors of war and the
risk of possible capture.231 Evidently, the supporters of this position
believe that war and the attending risk of capture by the enemy are
somehow less horrendous when faced by a man. The brutality and
carnage of war does not change as a result of the gender of the individ-
uals involved. To believe otherwise, degrades men.
Despite the fact that men and women differ in many ways, in
their most basic and fundamental character-their humanity-they
do not.23 It is perverse to argue that "women should not be drafted
where they will be slaughtered or maimed by the bayonets, the bombs,
the bullets, the handgrenades, the mines, the poison gas, and the shells
of the enemy ."..233 implying that someshow the same considerations
gressional policy behind the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. "[I]n a free society
the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve com-
ponents thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection
which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective
national economy." Id.
231. Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Worth Bagley, has stated:
For this nation to open combat roles to our women, short of a dire emergen-
cy, in my view, offends the dignity of womanhood and ignores the harsh
realities of war. Military history, the lessons of which again we ignore
at our peril, my own personal experience in combat, in prisoner of war
camps, and in command of units convince me that fighting is a man's job
and should remain so. Those who press to inject women in combat roles
grossly underestimate the physical, the mental and the emotional stresses
of combat in all its implications, including capture by the enemy. In my
view, Sherman was right: "War is hell and you cannot refine it." To seek
to do so to accommodate the pressures of social activism is to invite
disaster in battle.
BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 48.
232. 117 CONG. REC. H 35, 795 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Con-
gressman Drinan).
233. 118 CONG. REC. S9333 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
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are not involved when men are drafted. The implication is that a woman's
life is intrinsically more valuable than a man's life. No amount of logic
can support such an implication.3 '
In addition to the brutality faced by soldiers in combat, heavy
emphasis is placed on the risk of women's capture by the enemy. The
overriding concern is the "unthinkable consequences of those situa-
tions .... "235 The unthinkable consequence envisioned is rape. Rape
is a form of both physical and mental abuse, undoubtedly a heinous
violation of an individual's dignity. However, in the context of a prisoner
of war camp, amid countless other incidences of sexual, physical, and
mental abuse, the significance of rape is lessened. It is one more
dehumanizing and degrading experience suffered by the captured.2 36
Furthermore, men are similarly subject to the dehumanizing and
degrading atrocities, including sexual abuse, that captured soldiers
suffer at the hands of the enemy. Such an experience should clearly
be unthinkable in that situation as well. The error committed by advocates
of this view is not that the consequences of capture are unthinkable;
certainly the abuse captured soldiers are required to withstand is unthink-
able. But rather, that the consequences of capture, including physical
and mental abuse, are unthinkable only when women are forced to
suffer them.
234. During Congressional debates concerning an Equal Rights Amendment,
one congressman stated: "Although there is no doubt that all combat is dangerous,
degrading, and dehumanizing, we have a tendency to glorify it as manly when it comes
to men and only recognize its reality when the possibility of women assuming the
same role arises." 117 CONG. REC. H35, 978 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Con-
gressman Drinan). See also Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 977.
235. 118 CONG. REC. (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Stennis,
Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services).
236. The experiences of inmates in concentration camps in Nazi-occupied coun-
tries and internment camps in the Orient during World War II are analogous to those
experienced in prisoner of war camps. A particularly informative book was written
by a woman interned in a Japanese camp. Living conditions for men and women were
identical. Yet, "according to certain objectively determinable gauges, i.e., participa-
tion in or withdrawal from the internee-initiated camp program, actual and percentage
losses in weight, mental breakdown, deaths from disease, and suicides, women seemed
to adjust more readily to the internment situation than did men." E. VAUGHN, COM-
MUNITY UNDER STRESS: AN INTERNMENT CAMP CULTURE ix (1949). Ms. Vaughn states
that the population of the camp was 61% male and 39% female. Of the deaths due
to disease, 89.5% were men and 10.5% were women. All of the suicides in the camp
were men. Id.
For further reading, .see, H. KRAUSNICK, H. BUCHHEIM, M. BROSZAT, H. A.
JACOBSEN, ANATOMY OF AN SS STATE (1965); A. KEITH, THREE CAME HOME (1946); 0.
NANSEN, FFROM DAY TO DAY (1949).
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The statement that "war is hell and you cannot refine it""' 7 is
equally applicable to men and women. The brutality and horror faced
by soldiers in combat is not different if the soldier is male or female.
In addition, captured male soldiers are as vulnerable to the tortures
inflicted in prisoner of war camps as are female soldiers. War, with
all the attending consequences, is devastating for men.23 To believe
otherwise is to deman and devalue the humanity and lives of men.
Therefore, the assumption that only women should not face the horrors
of war cannot support the objective of the protection of women.
Last, there may be some truth to the statement that "this country,
societally speaking, is not ready for women sailing submarines . . .
and commanding aircraft carriers." '239 Nevertheless, what the United
States may or may not be ready for is not dispositive of right or
wrong. For many years, this country practiced slavery, racial discrimina-
tion in one of its worst forms. The fact that this country was not
ready to recognize black people as more than inferior human beings
did not make the institution of slavery right. Additionally, the country
was not ready to have black and white children in the same public
schools in 1954. Yet, the Supreme Court held that in the area of public
education, separate was not equal,24 and ordered the schools integrated.
The continuing controversy concerning desegration indicates that many
people in the United States are not yet ready to accept black and
white children in the same schools. Yet, it is doubtful that any court
would accept that justification for segregated schools. It would seem,
therefore, that the "ready for" argument is unpersuasive.
The governmental objective of protecting women with legislation
designed to benefit them is not an important governmental objective
in this day and age."' Protective legislation is merely additional
discrimination,'42 supported by the archaic notion that women need
the protection of men. The law does not permit the government to
seek to protect women paternalistically so as to relieve them from
the duties, obligations, and privileges of citizenship. 3 The paternalistic
attitude results in discrimination against men and women. Qualified
237. See supra note 231.
238. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. at 1062.
239. ERA and the Military, supra note 36 at 1549.
240. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
241. 118 CONG. REC. S9319 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Cook).
242. 117 CONG. REC. H35, 784 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Congressman
Gude); Brown, Emerson, supra note 28 at 873; Hale & Kanowitz, supra note 64 at 220.
243. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. at 1069.
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men are required to submit to combat duty, whereas qualified women
are not.244 The assumption that women are the center of the home
is no longer viable.2 5 Women are deprived of their status as full citizens
by being denied the responsibility and duty of the defense of their
nation.246 The attitude that only men should be vulnerable to the destruc-
tion of war and possible capture, implies that a man's life and humanity
are less valuable than a woman's life and humanity. u7 Therefore, the
governmental objective of protecting women does not pass the first
test of the middle-tier standard. Under the guise of rights and benefits,
both men and women are discriminated against by the statutory gender-
based classification prohibiting the assignment of women to combat
and combat-related positions. The gender-based classification denies
the equal protection of the laws because the objective allegedly served
by the classification is not an important governmental objective and
cannot serve to justify the gender-based classification.
The two governmental objectives sought to be furthered by the
gender-based classification prohibiting the assignment of women to
combat and combat-related positions are military necessity and the
protection of women. Military necessity is an important governmental
objective. However, that objective is not substantially furthered by
an overbroad classification prohibiting the assignment of all women
to combat positions. The gender-based classification used in Sections
8549 and 6015 establishes a presumption of combat unfitness, and does
not allow a woman to ever controvert that presumption. Therefore,
the gender-based classification violates the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.
As regards the protection of women, this objective, in light of
the requirements imposed by our emerging sense of humanity, cannot
be accepted as an important governmental objective. The gender-based
classification, which is intended to further the objective of the protec-
tion of women, cannot stand "when supported by no more substantial
justification thatn 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations or 'old notions'
that are more consistent with 'the role-typing society has long
imposed' than with contemporary reality.2 141 Further,
a traditional classification is more likely to be used without
244. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 209-30 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
248. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207.
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pausing to consider its justification than is a newly created
classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem ac-
ceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female,
alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much
of our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing
between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reac-
tion may have no rational relationship -other than pure pre-
judicial discrimination -to the stated purpose for which the
classification is being made."4 9
Under the middle-tier standard of review, which is applied to
gender-based classifications challenged on equal protection grounds,
the statutes that prohibit the assignment of women to combat and
combat-related positions are unconstitutional. The important govern-
mental objective of military necessity is not substantially furthered
by the gender-based classification. The governmental objective of the
protection of women is not an important governmental objective.
Therefore, the statutes employing the gender-based classification ex-
cluding women from combat are constitutionally infirm.
III. SUGGSTIONS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
WOMEN INTO COMBAT UNITS
Determining that the gender-based classification used in Sections
8549 and 6015 is discriminatory and violative of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment does not end the inquiry. The foregoing discus-
sion reveals the great amount of uncertainty surrounding the integra-
tion of women into combat units. To order an immediate and full-scale
integration in spite of the uncertainty would be inappropriate and ir-
responsible. Yet, recognition of the legitimate and complex problems
associated with sexual integration of combat units does not justify
an abandonment of the problem altogether. If initial, preliminary steps
are never taken, no change in the current situation could be realistically
expected. The following suggestions are general proposals for the initia-
tion of research and investigation to adequately assess the effects and
implications of sexual integration of combat units. The tests and ex-
periments would yield results over a period of years, therefore the
integration would take place gradually, as any potential problems were
encountered and solved.
One of the first steps should be an objective determination of
the necessary qualifications for combat soldiers in each of the armed
249. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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services. Such qualifications should be gender-neutral and should cor-
respond closely with the actual task or job to be performed. The qualifica-
tions should include both physical and mental requirements. The physical
requirements should reflect the changed nature of modern combat.
A reliable method should be utilized for determining which individuals
could meet the standard of physical fitness after the requisite training.
Assessing the effects of sexual integration on combat effectiveness
and group performance could be done only through actual experiments,
similar to the one conducted by the Navy aboard the U.S.S. Sanctuary.
Since such experiments are lacking in most areas of the armed services,
the guidelines drawn up would have to consider the classification, selec-
tion, and assignment of personnel very carefully." Care should be
taken to select participants with the necessary qualifications, but not
limit the selection to the outstanding individuals, since the results
would not be a true reflection of an average combat unit.
The current status of peace, as far as this country is concerned,
would allow the experiments designed to assess group performance
to proceed without endangering the lives of the individiuals in actual
combat situations. Combat situations should be simulated to test and
evaluate the integrated units' performance. But the attending risks
and danger inherent in actual combat zones would be absent, since
the experiments should be run in controlled environments.
Legislative modifications would be necessary for these experiments
to be conducted. 5' Two options are available. The statutory prohibitions
could be removed entirely, or the statutes could merely be modified
to the extent that certain exceptions would be allowed for a testing
period.125
Conclusion
To withstand an equal protection challenge, the middle-tier stan-
dard of review requires a gender-based classification to substantially
further important governmental objectives. The statutory gender-based
classification prohibiting the assignment of women to combat and combat-
related positions does not further the important governmental objec-
tive of military necessity in a manner consistent with the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Neither can the gender-based classifica-
tion used in the statutes support the objective of women's protection,
250. BINKIN & BACH, supra, note 56 at 110.
251. Id. at 112.
252. Id.
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since it is not an important governmental objective in light of contem-
porary attitudes and values. Therefore, the gender-based classification
used to exclude all women from combat positions offends the prohibi-
tions against the denial of the equal protection of the laws as embodied
in the fifth amendment. Accordingly, the law must be changed to allow
for the integration of women into combat units.
Jody M. Cramsie
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